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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Canada revised its refugee-determination system in 2012, dramatically speeding up the process 
and limiting substantive and procedural rights for some refugee claimants. Proponents argued that these 
revisions were needed to crack down on alleged abuse of the existing refugee determination system by 
“bogus” refugee claimants. 1 Hungarian refugee claimants - most of whom were Roma - were held out to 
be an example of this alleged abuse.
2
 Political actors, including Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
Jason Kenney, noted that large numbers of Hungarian refugee claims were made in Canada between 2008 
and 2012, few of which succeeded and many of which were withdrawn or abandoned.
3
 Declines in the 
number of Hungarian refugee claims made in Canada after the revisions were held out to be an indication 
that the reforms have been successful.
4
 
 Many advocates for refugees, however, contest this story about Hungarian Romani refugee 
claimants and abuse of the refugee-determination system.
5
 They point to evidence collected by human-
rights organizations of persecution against Roma in Hungary, and they note that many Hungarian Roma 
have been granted refugee protection on this basis in Canada.
6
 They also argue that the frequency with 
which Hungarian Romani refugee claims were denied or abandoned is not necessarily proof of abuse of 
                                                     
1
 See e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Speaking notes for the Honourable Jason Kenney” (29 June 2012), 
online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-06-29.asp>. 
2
 For a discussion of Hungarian Roma as an oft-cited exemplar of allegedly abusive refugee claims in these debates, 
see C. Levine-Rasky, J. Beaudoin & P. St Clair, “The Exclusion of Roma claimants in Canadian Refugee Policy” 
(2014) 48:1 Patterns of Prejudice 67. 
3
 See e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Speaking notes for The Honourable Jason Kenney” (14 December 
2014), online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-12-14.asp>. 
4
 See e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Speaking notes for Chris Alexander” (22 January 2014), online: 
<http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=831769 >. 
5
 See e.g., R. Westhead, “Why the Roma are Fleeing Hungary and Why Canada is Shunning them”, Toronto Star 
(13 October 2012); G. Csanyi-Robah, “Protecting Roma Refugees: a Unique Perspective”, Canadian Jewish News 
(14 January 2013); K. Shane, “Critics Urge Rethink of Hungary’s Safe-Country Label”, Embassy Magazine (23 
April 2014). 
6
 See e.g., Roma Community Centre, “Roma Refugees in Canada and Bill C-31: Brief Submitted to Canadian 
Government Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration” (29 April 2012), online: 
<http://www.romatoronto.org/pdf/Roma_Community_Centre_brief_to_CIMM_re_Bill_C-31.pdf>; K. Harris, 
“Refugee Board Approves Claimants Labelled ‘Bogus’ by Ottawa”, CBC News (11 July 2014), online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/refugee-board-approves-claimants-labelled-bogus-by-ottawa-1.2701153>. 
 Page 3 of 58 
the system, and that this may instead be evidence of flaws in the refugee-determination system.
7
 Some go 
further and contend that Romani refugee claimants fled persecution in Hungary only to be confronted 
with similar mistreatment in Canada.
8
 
 Unfortunately, much of the debate about Hungarian Romani refugee claims in Canada has 
occurred in an evidentiary vacuum. The purpose of this article is to fill this vacuum by setting out the 
results of a quantitative and qualitative empirical study of Hungarian Romani refugee claims. The article 
begins by discussing the context of the study, offering an overview of the historic and contemporary 
experience of Roma in Hungary and outlining the history of Hungarian Romani migration to Canada, 
including two recent streams of migration by Hungarian Romani refugee claimants and Canada’s 
response to these claimants. The article then moves on to an empirical study about the experience of 
Hungarian Romani with Canada’s refugee determination system between 2008 and 2012. Finally, the 
article offers concluding remarks, focusing on several particularly troubling findings from the study, 
including the impact of anti-refugee rhetoric, concerns about institutional bias and inconsistent decision 
making at the Immigration and Refugee Board, and problems related to quality of counsel. 
 
2. CONTEXT  
2.1. The Roma in Hungary 
 The term “Roma” encompasses a range of peoples around the world who share a common 
heritage originating in India.
9
 Many also share a Romani language, with varied dialects.
10
 Romani 
peoples moved from India across the Byzantine Empire before entering Europe, where they have been 
                                                     
7
 See e.g., C. Ruf, “A Taste of Tolerance”, UCObserver (January 2012). 
8
 See e.g., B. Farber, N. Leipciger and A. Rosenweig, “Hating the Jew, Hating the ‘Gypsy’”, National Post (25 
September 2012); K. Nerenberg, “First they Demonized the Roma, but I did not Speak Out Because I was not 
Roma...”, Rabble.ca (20 December 2012), online: <http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/karl-nerenberg/2012/12/first-
they-demonized-roma-i-did-not-speak-out-because-i-was-no>.  
9
 For general historical accounts of Romani peoples, see A. Fraser, The Gypsies (Oxford: Blackwell 1992); I. 
Hancock, We are the Romani People (Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002); D. Crowe, A History of the 
Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). For an analysis of recent evidence 
of a common heritage in India, see P. Bakker, “Romani Genetic Linguistics and Genetics: Results, Prospects and 
Problems” (2012) 22:2 Romani Studies 91. 
10
 Y. Matras, Romani: A Linguistic Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 Page 4 of 58 
present since the 14th century or earlier.
11
 Historical documents describe Romani presence in what is now 
Hungary by the mid-16th century.
12
  
 Today, there are large Romani communities in many European countries, including Hungary. 
Population estimates vary, but it is generally agreed that around 10-12 million Roma currently reside in 
Europe.
13
 According to figures collected by the Council of Europe in 2010, Hungary was home to the 
sixth-largest Romani community in Europe, with a population between 400,000 and 1,000,000, which 
represented 4 to 10 percent of the Hungarian population.
14
  
 Unfortunately, anti-Roma persecution has deep roots in Hungary, as it does in much of Europe.
15
 
For centuries, this persecution has drawn on and perpetuated stereotypes about so-called ‘Gypsies’, a 
label often imposed on, but rejected by, many Romani communities.
16
 According to these stereotypes, 
Roma are nomadic peoples, reluctant to settle permanently and take up productive jobs, preferring instead 
transient lifestyles. These stereotypes also take a variety of other forms, ranging from romanticized and 
sexualized images of travelling ‘Gypsy’ musicians and fortunetellers to explicitly racist characterizations 
of ‘Gypsies’ as criminals, beggars, and thieves.17  
 Such stereotypes not only gloss over the wide diversity of Romani communities but also 
downplay the degree to which migration, precariousness, and transience are related to centuries of 
persecution.
18
 As early as the 15th century, many European countries passed laws expelling Roma from 
their territories, and continued to do so well into the 18th century.
19
 Other countries went further, passing 
                                                     
11
 I. Kemény, “History of Roma in Hungary” in I. Kemény & B. Janky, eds, Roma of Hungary (Boulder: Social 
Science Monographs, 2005) 1 at 1. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 European Commission, “EU and Roma”, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm>. 
14
 Council of Europe, “Roma and Travellers”, online: <http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers>. 
15
 M. Brearley, “The Persecution of Gypsies in Europe” (2001) 45:4 American Behavioral Scientist 588; T. 
Hammarberg, Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe: 2012)  
16
 Ibid (Hammarberg) at 31. 
17
 Council of Europe, “Is this a Stereotype: A Tool for Fighting Stereotypes Towards Roma”, online: 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/source/documents/toolstereotypesEN.pdf>. 
18
 D. Petrova, “The Roma: Between and Myth and the Future” (2003) 70:1 Social Research 111 at 119-125 
19
 Ibid (Petrova) at 119-125; Z. Barany, “The East European Gypsies in the Imperial Age” (2001) 24:1 Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 50 at 58; V. Ljujic, et al, “Romaphobia: A unique phenomenon?” (2012) 22:2 Rom Stud 141. 
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laws enslaving all Roma.
20
 Hungary largely focused on strategies involving assimilation - making Roma 
disappear as a community - rather than on expulsion or enslavement. For example, in 1753, a decree 
prohibited Roma from moving around the country, from owning horses, playing music, wearing 
traditional clothing, or marrying amongst themselves.
21
 Further laws banned the Hungarian word for 
Roma (Cigány), outlawed use of the Romani language, and ordered that Romani children be taken away 
from their families.
22
 Migration was a key strategy through which Roma sought to avoid such persecutory 
laws.
23
 
 European attacks on Romani communities continued in Hungary and across Europe throughout 
the 18th and 19th centuries. They reached an apex in the 20th century during the Holocaust, known in 
Romani as Porrajmos (“the Devouring”).24 Estimates of the number of Roma killed by the Nazis vary 
greatly, ranging from 250,000 to 1,500,000 or more.
25
 Irrespective of the uncertainty around the numbers, 
however, it is clear that the Nazis intended to eliminate the entire Romani population across Europe.
26
 In 
Hungary, the fascist Arrow Cross Party, which seized power shortly after the German invasion in 1944, 
orchestrated the genocide against the Hungarian Romani community.
27
 Thousands of Hungarian Roma 
were murdered,
28
 and far more would have been killed had the Nazis won WWII.
29
 
 After WWII, the mistreatment of Hungarian Roma continued, albeit to a lesser extent, during the 
imposition of Communism under Soviet rule.
30
 Hungarian Roma were not included in land redistribution, 
                                                     
20
 Hancock, supra note 9 at 21. 
21
 Kemény, supra note 11 at 15-16.  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Crowe, supra note 9 at xvii. 
24
 See generally, G. Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
25
 Petrova, supra note 18 at 130; D. Crowe, “The Roma Holocaust” in B. Schwartz & FC. DeCoste, eds, The 
Holocaust's ghost: writings on art, politics, law and education (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2000) 178 at 
197. 
26
 B. Fisher, “No Roads Lead to Rom: The Fate of the Romani People Under the Nazis and in Post-War Restitution” 
(1999) 20 Whittier L. Rev. 513 at 526. 
27
 Kemény, supra note 11 at 47-48. 
28
 Ibid at 48; Crowe, supra note 25 at 193. 
29
 Ibid (Kemény), at 48. 
30
 M. Stewart, “Communist Roma policy 1945-1989 as seen through the Hungarian case” in W. Guy, ed, Between 
past and future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe (Great Britain: University of Hertfordshire, 2001) 71 at 
71.  
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meaning they could neither own nor farm on land of their own.
31
 Communism did provide employment 
opportunities for many Roma, but Romani families were still much poorer than the Hungarian average 
under Soviet rule.
32
 
 Since the collapse of Communism in 1989, anti-Roma sentiment in Hungary has increased 
dramatically.
33
 Faced with both workplace discrimination and the elimination of many Communist-era 
industries in which Roma predominated, unemployment rates for Roma have skyrocketed.
34
 Other 
economic and social indicators for Roma in Hungary, including massive poverty rates, substandard 
housing, excessive reliance on government transfers, poor health metrics, and low representation rates in 
political institutions are also troubling.
35
 Hungarian Roma are also disproportionately subject to police 
enforcement activities.
36
 Furthermore, abysmally low education rates are especially worrisome
37
 - though 
these rates are perhaps not surprising, given that Hungarian Roma children are disproportionately placed 
in special schools and classes designated for children with ‘mental disabilities’, leading to de facto 
racially segregated schools.
38
  
 Roma in Hungary have also been confronted with mounting racist rhetoric and violence, all too 
often with the support of the Hungarian political leadership.
39
 The European Roma Rights Centre has 
documented dozens of incidents between 2008 and 2012 where Hungarian Roma were subject to racist 
attacks, some of which resulted in deaths.
40
 Far-right extremist groups, including the Hungarian Guard, 
have conducted paramilitary marches in Romani neighbourhoods protesting “Gypsy crime” while openly 
                                                     
31
 Kemény, supra note 11 at 49. 
32
 Ibid at 52-60.  
33
 Hammarberg, supra note 15. 
34 A. Ivanov & A Zheli︠ a︡zkova, The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe: Avoiding the Dependency Trap (UNDP, 
2002) at 13-21 & 31-37.  
35
 Ibid at 39-51.  
36
 Hammarberg, supra note 15 at 80-84. 
37
 UNICEF, “Towards Roma Inclusion: A Review of Roma Education Initiatives in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe” (2010), online: <http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/ROMA_PAPER_FINAL_LAST.pdf> at 12; C. Brüggemann, 
“Roma Education in Comparative Perspective” (Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, 2012). 
38
 Ibid (Brüggemann) at 63-71; Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, No 11146/11, [2013] ECHR. 
39
 “Violent Attacks against Roma in Hungary: Time to Investigate Racial Motivation”, Amnesty International (10 
November 2010), online: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR27/001/2010/en/7ee79730-e23f-4f20-834a-
deb8deb23464/eur270012010en.pdf> at 13. 
40
 European Roma Centre, “Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008-September 2012” (1 October 2012), 
online: < http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/attacks-list-in-hungary.pdf>. 
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deploying Nazi imagery.
41
 Although the Hungarian Guard has officially been disbanded, its former 
members continue to undertake anti-Roma activities and other organizations have quickly taken up 
similar measures.
42
 Moreover, many leading Hungarian political figures support both the Hungarian 
Guard and its replacements. For example, in 2010 the Chair of Jobbik - an extreme far right-wing political 
party with representation in Hungary’s National Assembly and in the European Parliament - wore a 
Hungarian Guard uniform to the swearing in of the Hungarian Parliament.
43
 The same year, the Vice 
Chair of Jobbik suggested that Roma constitute a threat to public safety and should be restricted to living 
in what amount to concentration camps.
44
 More recently, Zsolt Bayer, a founding member of Hungary’s 
ruling Fidesz party said, “[m]ost Gypsies are not suitable for cohabitation. They are not suitable for being 
among people. Most are animals and behave like animals. They shouldn’t be tolerated or understood, but 
stamped out.”45 
 Although some institutions - at the national, European, and international levels - have taken steps 
to try to protect the human rights of Hungarian Roma,
46
 international human-rights bodies and non-
governmental organizations report that the mistreatment of Hungarian Roma continues.
47
 For example, a 
recent report by the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights found that, between 
2008 and 2012, prejudice and discrimination against Roma escalated and that hate speech and violent 
attacks by extremist groups proliferated.
48
 The report went on to conclude: 
                                                     
41
 Vona v Hungary, No 35943/10, [2003] ECHR at para 69. 
42
 Hammarberg, supra note 15 at 48; US Department of State, “Hungary 2014 Crime and Safety Report” (14 March 
2014), online: <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15321>. 
43
 Ibid (Hammarberg). 
44
 Ibid (Hammarberg) at 42. 
45
 C. Rowlands, “Hungary's rabid right is taking the country to a political abyss”, The Guardian (5 February 2013). 
46
 For an outline of these measures, see G Muigai, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Githu Muigai: Mission to Hungary, UNGAOR, 
20th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/20/33/Add.1 (2012) at para 29-33. 
47
 Ibid at para 34-41; European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: 
standards and practices in Hungary (2012/2130); Amnesty International, “Hungary: Murder convictions are 'wake-
up call' over hate crimes against Roma” (6 August 2013), online: < http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/hungary-roma-
trial-verdict-2013-08-06>. 
48
 François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, “Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in 
Hungary” (February 2014), online: <http://fxb.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/02/FXB-Hungary-
Report_Released-February-4-2014.pdf> at 42-43. 
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Although the incidents provided very clear signals for taking action, the Government 
response was inadequate to stem the rise in racial crimes and extremist action.  
 
The fact that these acts have not provoked a strong governmental response has 
emboldened the perpetrators and their followers, and has led to the perception that such 
action is the preferred solution to a problem defined in racist terms.  
 
In the last five years, the increasing tolerance of far right speech and activity against the 
Roma in Hungary has led to institutionalization of racist political parties, acceptance of 
paramilitary organizations, anti-democratic legislation, and police indifference and 
impunity. These developments point to the heightened possibility that Hungary is moving 
into a more violent phase.
49
  
 
  We agree with this assessment. While we acknowledge that the Hungarian state has made efforts 
to improve the circumstances of Hungarian Roma, it is our view that these measures have failed to stop 
the alarming escalation of anti-Roma activities in recent years. As will now be seen, the ongoing 
mistreatment of Roma in Hungary has prompted significant numbers to flee and seek refuge in other 
countries, including Canada. 
 
2.2. History of Hungarian Roma Migration to Canada  
 Canada has been home to Romani communities since at least the end of the 19th century,
50
 
though the size of those communities today is not entirely clear. In the 2011 Canadian National 
Household Survey, 5,255 respondents identified as Romani.
51
 Census data, however, is notorious for 
undercounting Romani populations.
52
 The Roma Community Centre in Toronto offers a much higher 
estimate of the Canadian Roma population, at around 80,000.
53
 Data on the Canadian population of Roma 
with Hungarian heritage is even less clear. One way to estimate that population would be to look to the 
2011 National Household survey, in which around 317,000 respondents identified themselves as at least 
                                                     
49
 Ibid. 
50
 R. Lee, “Post-Communism Romani Migration to Canada” (2000) 13:2 Cambridge Rev Int Aff 51 at 51-52 [Lee, 
“Romani Migration”]; C. Smith, Gypsies, Preachers and Big White Bears: One Hundred Years on Country Roads 
(Burnstown, Ontario: General Store Publishing House, 1998).  
51
 Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household Survey (Ethnic Origin), Catalogue no. 99-010-X2011028. 
52
 P. Simon, “Collecting Ethnic Statistics in Europe: a Review” (2012) 35:8 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1366 at 1385-
6; A. Krisán, “Group Self-determination, Individual Rights, or Social Inclusion? Competing Frames for Ethnic 
Counting in Hungary” (2012) 35:8 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1392 at 1401. 
53
 R. Lee, “Roma in Canada” (October 1998), online: <http://www.romatoronto.org/facts_canada.html>.  
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partly of Hungarian heritage.
54
 As we have seen, Roma constitute somewhere around four to ten per cent 
of the population in Hungary, but it is not obvious that the same proportion would hold in the Canadian 
context. What is clear, however, is that Roma have long come to Canada as part of immigration from 
Hungary. 
 The history of Hungarian immigration to Canada involves intermittent patterns of what would 
today be considered mixed migration: migration aimed to varying degrees at escaping persecution (i.e., 
refugees), and at searching for improved economic circumstances (i.e., economic migrants).
55
 Scholars 
have identified several ‘streams’ or ‘waves’ of Hungarian immigration to Canada, starting in the latter 
half of the 19th century, and there are controversies over the degree to which each stream involved 
refugees or economic migrants.
56
 This is not surprising, considering both the complexity of motives that 
drive most migration and the narrowness of the refugee definition. Under international law, the refugee 
definition is restricted to those who have well-founded fears of persecution on account of their race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
57
 Many people seeking 
to migrate in order to avoid various types of serious harms - including wars, collapsed states, 
humanitarian disasters, discrimination, and persecution on grounds other than those specified - may not 
meet the refugee definition even though they also cannot reasonably be characterized as economic 
migrants.
58
 Nonetheless, debates about Hungarian immigration to Canada often come down to the 
refugee-versus-economic migrant dichotomy. 
                                                     
54
 Statistics Canada, supra note 51. 
55
 For a critique of these labels (i.e. refugee versus economic migrant) in contemporary mixed migration contexts, 
see R. Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization” (2007) 20:2 
Journal of Refugee Studies 172. 
56
 See generally, N. Dreisziger, “The 1956-57 Refugee Movement in the Context of Hungarian Immigration to 
Canada since the Late 19th Century” in C. Adam, et al, eds, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Hungarian and 
Canadian Perspectives (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2010) 197. 
57
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, Art 1(A)(2). 
58
 For a discussion of the restricted refugee definition and the complexity of motivations for migration, see T.A. 
Aleinikoff, “From ‘Refugee Law’ to the ‘Law of Coerced Migration’” (1994) 9:4 American University International 
Law Review 25. 
 Page 10 of 58 
 Perhaps the most well-known stream of Hungarian migration to Canada occurred in 1956, when 
an uprising against the Soviet-installed regime in Hungary was met with a Soviet military invasion.
59
 
During the three-week uprising, Hungary’s borders were opened, and more than 200,000 Hungarians 
fled.
60
 Most would today be considered refugees fleeing persecution on account of their political 
opinions. However, some were also likely motivated by better living conditions in the West and so could 
arguably be considered economic migrants.
61
  
 At any rate, when the Hungarian refugee crisis erupted in 1956, Canada had not yet signed on to 
the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and had no official refugee determination system in place. 
Nonetheless, within days, Canadian immigration officials were dispatched to Europe, regular immigration 
screening procedures were truncated, transportation was organized, and, ultimately, over 37,000 
Hungarians arrived in Canada in less than a year.
62
  
 Canada’s rapid resettlement of Hungarian refugees in 1956 was an important humanitarian 
achievement, and it helped to shape Canadian responses to subsequent refugee crises.
63
 It is, however, 
worth noting that the government was reluctant to offer resettlement until community organizations 
agreed to shoulder most of the financial burden.
64
 Moreover, the resettlement efforts largely reflected 
traditional national interests, including advancing the Cold War anti-Communist agenda and fuelling the 
                                                     
59
 See generally, J. Rainer, “The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Causes, Aims and Course of Events” in C. Adam, et 
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expanding Canadian economy.
65
 It is also important to emphasize that, in a period of openly racist 
Canadian immigration policies, the majority of those resettled were both Christian and white.
66
 Indeed, 
Canadian immigration officials fretted about Hungarian refugees who did not fall into these groups, 
including Jews who, in one immigration official’s words, were not “bona fide” refugees but had instead 
“taken advantage of the situation.”67  
 Notwithstanding the racist attitudes of Canadian immigration officials at the time, some 
Hungarian refugees selected for resettlement to Canada in 1956 were Romani.
68
 Unfortunately, while 
Canada’s response to Hungarian refugees in 1956 has attracted substantial academic attention, little is 
known about Roma included among this group, partly because many would have been reluctant to 
disclose their ethnicity out of fear of discrimination, and partly because Canada chose not to gather this 
information.
69
 To this day, however, many Canadian Roma cite 1956 as a pivotal point in their family 
histories.
70
  
 After the 1956 uprising, the level of Hungarian migration to Canada throughout the remainder of 
the Soviet period was modest. From 1959 to 1967, approximately 275 Hungarian refugees came to 
Canada each year.
71
 From 1967 to 1984, an average of 400 Hungarians immigrated to Canada yearly,
72
 
some through family-reunification programs and others as refugees.
73
 Then, from 1985 to 1989, 
Hungarian migration to Canada underwent a small upsurge, with around 850 Hungarians, approximately 
700 of whom were refugees, immigrating to Canada each year.
74
 For much of this period, merely being 
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Hungarian and outside the Eastern Bloc countries was sufficient to make a person qualify as a de facto 
refugee under a designated “self-exiled” class - though there were restrictions on the number of persons 
admitted under this class.
75
 By 1990, with the end of the Soviet period, concerns about economic migrants 
exploiting this class
76
 led to its elimination.
77
  
 The key points in all of this for our purposes are that, until the end of the Soviet period, 
Hungarian Roma came to Canada as part of the regular streams of Hungarian immigration, and that their 
ethnicity was seldom explicitly treated as relevant to how they qualified for immigration to Canada. 
Instead, they immigrated mostly under the family class or as refugees fearing political persecution at the 
hands of the Soviet regime. With the end of the Soviet period, however, that quickly changed. 
 
2.3. Romani Refugee Claims and Canada’s response: 1998 to 2002  
 In 1994, within a few years of the end of Soviet rule in Hungary, Canada dropped its visa 
requirement against Hungary, meaning that Hungarian citizens could travel to Canada without obtaining 
prior permission from the Canadian government.
78
 Simultaneously, as we have seen, the mistreatment of 
Hungarian Roma increased substantially in the post-Soviet period. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
many Hungarian Roma came to Canada claiming refugee status. Unlike in the Soviet period, however, 
they based their refugee claims explicitly on persecution related to their Romani ethnicity.
79
  
 Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in the post-Soviet period arrived in Canada in two streams. 
The first stream involved approximately 9,500 refugee claims made between 1998 and 2002, representing 
about 6% of the total number of refugee claims made in Canada during this period.
80
 At first, recognition 
rates in these cases were very high: around 70% of the approximately 200 Hungarian refugee claims 
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decided on the merits in 1998 resulted in grants of refugee protection.
81
 In the same year, all published 
Hungarian refugee determinations involved persecution on account of Romani ethnicity, and all were 
positive decisions.
82
  
 However, in 1999, in anticipation of increased numbers of Hungarian Romani refugee claims, the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) decided a lead case,
83
 which is a tool for enhancing consistency in 
refugee determinations by providing non-binding guidance in cases involving similar facts.
84
 The lead 
case, which found that Hungarian Roma do not face persecution and instead enjoy state protection in 
Hungary, was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal in 2006 due to a reasonable apprehension of 
bias.
85
 Relying in part on emails exchanged within the IRB and with other government agencies, the 
Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) found that:  
a reasonable person might well have concluded [...] that the panel [...] was not impartial. 
This is because one of its two panel members may have been predisposed towards 
denying the appellants’ claims since he had played a leading role in an exercise that may 
seem to have been partly motivated by a desire by CIC [Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada] and the Board [the IRB] to produce an authoritative, if non-binding legal and 
factual “precedent”, particularly on the adequacy of state protection, which would be 
used to reduce the percentage of positive decisions in claims for refugee status by 
Hungarian Roma. The panel may reasonably be seen to have been insufficiently 
independent from Board management and thus tainted by the Board’s motivation for the 
leading case strategy. Support for a belief that the lead case strategy was motivated by a 
desire to deter potential claimants is the apparent leak to the Hungarian media of the 
negative decisions before they were released, and the ensuing publicity calculated to 
deter Roma from leaving for Canada in order to claim refugee status.
86
 
 
In other words, the FCA found it reasonable to believe that, through the lead case, the IRB was attempting 
to manufacture a negative precedent that would reduce recognition rates and discourage Hungarian 
Romani refugee claimants from coming to Canada. Unfortunately, while the FCA overturned the lead 
case in 2006, the damage was already done. The year that lead case was decided, Hungarian refugee claim 
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recognition rates dropped precipitously (from around 70% in 1998 to around 16% in 1999) and remained 
low for years (around 25% for 1999 to 2002).
87
 The Canadian government also pointed to these low 
recognition rates when, in a bid to reduce the number of Hungarian refugee claimants coming to Canada, 
it re-imposed a visa requirement in 2001.
88
  
 Between the unfairly induced low recognition rates and the visa requirement, the number of 
Hungarian refugee claims made in Canada plummeted from an average of around 2,000 per year from 
1998 to 2002 to an average of less than 100 claims per year from 2003 to 2007.
89
 Nonetheless, it should 
be noted that, from 1998 to 2002, over 1,000 Hungarians were granted refugee protection in Canada.
90
 
 
2.4. Romani Refugee Claims and Canada’s response: 2008 to 2012  
 The second stream of Hungarian Romani refugee migration to Canada - which is the subject of 
this article - occurred between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, due to international trade pressure,
91
 Canada once 
again dropped the visa requirement for Hungarian citizens.
92
 As a result, the number of Hungarian refugee 
claims rose considerably, with over 11,000 Hungarians (or around 8% of the total number of refugee 
claims made in Canada during this period) claiming refugee status between 2008 and 2012.
93
 Statistics 
regarding the number of claims made and the outcomes of these claims are discussed in detail below. 
Suffice it to say, though, that, while hundreds of these claims succeeded, most did not, and many were 
withdrawn or abandoned.
94
  
 Canada’s reaction to the most recent stream of Hungarian refugee claimants can, in our view, be 
best described as a racialized panic. Hungarian refugee claimants during this period, who were largely 
Romani,
95
 were regularly decried as ‘bogus’ refugee claimants.96 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
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Jason Kenney frequently pointed to large numbers of unsuccessful Hungarian refugee claims as evidence 
that the refugee-determination system was vulnerable to abuse and in need of reform.
97
 For example, at a 
news conference announcing measures aimed at “discouraging [the arrival of] those who are not refugees 
but [who] seek to abuse our generosity”, Kenney stated that 
[I]t’s cause for serious concern that the European Union, with its democratic tradition of 
freedom, respect for human rights and independent judiciaries, has been the number one 
source for asylum claims made in Canada over most of the past three years [...] [S]ince 
[...] 2008, we’ve seen some 6,000 Hungarian asylum claims finalized [...] [and] virtually 
none of them turn out to be well-founded. 
  
 Hungarian Romani refugee claimants were also accused of coming to Canada to take advantage 
of social programs. According to Minister Kenney, Hungarian claimants came to Canada not because they 
“need our protection” but rather “to benefit from the generosity of Canada’s social welfare system.”98 He 
also told a Senate Committee that Hungarian refugee claimants come to Canada because of programs 
such as the GST rebate, the Child Tax Benefit, welfare, public housing and health care.
99
 As he put it, 
“there is a wide series of benefits that people can obtain, which appears to be a significant factor in that 
migration.”100 An internal Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) report expressed a similar view 
about Hungarian Romani refugee claimants, accusing them of “entering refugee claims for economic 
betterment.”101 The report also states that “it is a widely accepted assumption that many of these 
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individuals are taking advantage of Canada’s refugee processing system, social assistance, and other 
benefits.”102  
 Not only did government officials assert that Hungarian Romani refugee claimants were 
fraudsters who came to Canada to abuse welfare and other social programs, but they also issued warnings 
about risks of criminality. For example, the same internal CBSA report that said Hungarian Romani 
refugee claimants come to Canada for “economic betterment”, also suggested that Hungarian Roma “are 
known to engage in petty theft, break and enter, fraud and forgery, and assault.”103 Who, exactly, this is 
“known” to is unclear, but it is clear that such assertions both invoke and perpetuate stereotypes about 
Romani cultures being tied to criminality. Other government actors, including Minister Kenney, spoke 
frequently about crimes alleged to have been committed by a few individuals in the Hungarian Romani 
community in Canada, and did so in a manner that implied widespread criminality within this community. 
For example, in comments made to a Parliamentary committee, Minister Kenney implied a connection 
between a criminal investigation into human trafficking and large numbers of unsuccessful Hungarian 
refugee claims made in Canada.
104
 The criminal investigation that the Minister referred to ended up 
resulting in several convictions.
105
 There was intense media coverage of the convictions, and the Romani 
heritage of the perpetrators was widely cited, yet the fact that most victims of the crime were vulnerable 
because they were seeking to escape anti-Roma mistreatment in their home country was not widely 
discussed.
106
 
 In May 2012, Gina Csanyi-Robah, Executive Director of the Roma Community Centre in 
Toronto, pleaded with a Parliamentary committee to reject the way that the most recent stream of 
Hungarian Roma were being presented by government officials and by the media, warning that anti-Roma 
rhetoric was making its way to Canada: 
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Don’t believe the stereotypes about us that we’re criminals. [...] There was one case 
[with] 20 people involved. [...] There have been Roma living in Canada for over 100 
years. There are over 80,000 of us. [...] One case cannot represent [...] an entire 
community of people. It’s racism. [...] 
 
In Canada, we’re [...] talking about bogus refugees, criminals, and people living off the 
welfare system. When people legitimately need help in Canada, they are being doubly 
victimized. They’re being told to get out of Hungary. They’re being told that Hungary is 
for Hungarians -- ethnic Magyars. After longer than Canada has been a country, they are 
told to get out.... They come here and people are, like, “You’re criminals”. It’s the same 
rhetoric, the same discourse, that’s happening in these European societies, and we’re 
allowing it to come here.
107
 
 
 Unfortunately, these last remarks proved to be especially prescient. On 5 September 2012, in a 
television segment on the Sun News Network, conservative pundit Ezra Levant went on a viciously racist 
tirade against Hungarian Romani refugee claimants, deploying all the standard anti-Roma rhetoric: 
I told you about the wave of fraudulent refugee claims made by Gypsies trying to lie their 
way into Canada. [...] I mean, they’re coming from Hungary, for crying out loud, a rich, 
generous, liberal democracy. No one’s a refugee from Hungary [...]  
 
But these are Gypsies, a culture synonymous with swindlers. The phrase “Gypsy” and 
“cheater” have been [so] interchangeable historically that the word has entered the 
English language as a verb -- he “gypped” me.  
 
Well, the Gypsies have gypped us. Too many have come here as false refugees. And they 
come here to gyp us again, to rob us blind as they have done in Europe for centuries. [...]  
 
The Gypsies aren’t a race, they aren’t a religion, they aren’t a linguistic group. They’re 
[...] a shiftless group of hoboes [...]  
 
For centuries, these roving highway gangs have mocked the law and robbed their way 
across Europe. Now, because of our broken refugee system, they’re here in Canada by 
the thousands and they’ve brought a Gypsy crime wave with them.108 
 
 Given all this rhetoric, it is not surprising that the government sought out measures to deter 
further Hungarian Roma from seeking refugee protection in Canada. Various options were considered. 
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Re-imposing the visa requirement was put forward as a possibility,
109
 but this proved not to be viable in 
light of negotiations regarding a Canada-EU free trade deal.
110
 Another option reportedly considered was 
the mass detention of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants pending the determination of their claims.
111
 
 Ultimately, the measure selected by the government to, among other things, deter the arrival of 
Hungarian Romani refugee claimants, was to substantially reform Canada’s refugee determination 
system.
112
 The new system, which came into effect in December 2012,
113
 purportedly aims to discourage 
unfounded refugee claims by speeding up the process and by limiting the procedural and substantive 
rights of various groups of refugee claimants, including claimants from Designated Countries of Origin 
(DCO).
114
 Under the new system, claimants from DCOs are subject to expedited refugee claim processing 
timelines,
115
 cannot appeal negative refugee determinations to the Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB,
116
 
do not benefit from an automatic stay on removal pending Federal Court review of their refugee 
determinations,
117
 and are subject to restrictions on access to Pre-Removal Risk Assessments (a pre-
deportation procedure through which new risks that have arisen since the time of a person’s refugee claim 
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are assessed).
118
 They are also denied access to publicly funded health care, even while their refugee 
claims are pending.
119
 Similarly, DCO claimants are ineligible for work permits,
120
 and legislation 
currently before Parliament would allow provinces to deny social assistance to refugee claimants.
121
 To 
no one’s surprise, Hungary was among the first countries to be listed as a DCO. Thus, Hungarian Romani 
refugee claimants are now subject to all of these limitations.
122
 
 All of these features of the revised refugee-determination system have come under sustained 
critique from human-rights organizations,
123
 lawyers’ associations,124 and legal academics.125 The Federal 
Court has gone so far as to hold
126
 that the restrictions on publicly funded health care for DCO claimants 
are unconstitutional due to violations of non-discrimination norms
127
 and violations of the right to be free 
from cruel and unusual treatment.
128
 In coming to these conclusions, Federal Court Justice Mactavish 
offered a devastating critique of the DCO provisions: 
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The distinction drawn between [...] refugee claimants from DCO and non-DCO countries 
also serves to further marginalize, prejudice, and stereotype refugee claimants from DCO 
countries. In particular, it perpetuates the stereotype that refugee claimants from DCO 
countries are queue-jumpers, “bogus” claimants and cheats who are only here to take 
advantage of Canada’s social benefits and its generosity.[...] 
 
[T]he fact is that some refugee claimants from DCO countries are indeed genuine 
refugees. By way of example, in 2011, the Immigration and Refugee Board accepted 155 
refugee claims from Hungary. [...] 
 
It is also true that a substantial percentage of refugee claims from DCO countries do not 
succeed. Does it necessarily follow that these claims were all “bogus”, brought by queue 
jumpers and cheats seeking to abuse the generosity of Canadians? To suggest that this is 
the case is to have a grossly simplistic understanding of the refugee process.[...] 
 
Refugee claims are often brought on the basis of real hardship and genuine suffering. 
Amongst those whose claims do not succeed will be individuals who may well have 
come to Canada because of a real fear of persecution in their country of origin, but who 
were unable to meet the strict legal requirements of the refugee definition. 
 
By way of example, a Roma from Hungary may have experienced a lifetime of 
discrimination, abuse and marginalization in her country. She may truly dread returning 
home as a result of her past experiences. The Immigration and Refugee Board may well 
accept the claimant’s story as true, but may conclude that the treatment experienced by 
the claimant, while discriminatory, did not rise to the level of “persecution”. 
Alternatively, the Board may accept that the claimant had experienced “persecution”, but 
may also find that adequate state protection is available to her in Hungary. Under either 
scenario, the fact that the refugee claim did not ultimately succeed does not mean that 
there was anything “bogus” about it.129 
 
 Thus far, the government has been unmoved by these critiques.
130
 Instead, Canadian officials 
celebrate the reforms and insist that they were necessary to deter ‘bogus’ Hungarian refugee claims.131 
Indeed, the government was so keen to use the reforms to this end that, in January 2013, they launched an 
advertisement campaign in Hungary to publicize the changes.
132
 The campaign focused on the town of 
Miskolc, which has a large Romani population. Six billboards in Miskolc were outfitted with Canadian 
government logos, a notice about revisions to the refugee determination system, as well as the message: 
                                                     
129
 Ibid (Doctors), at para 837-843. 
130
 The government is, for example, appealing the Federal Court decision. D. Black, “Federal court rules refugee 
health-care cuts 'cruel and unusual': Tories vow to fight decision citing commitment to helping genuine claimants, 
citizens”, Toronto Star (5 July 2014) A4. 
131
 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Speaking notes for Chris Alexander, Canada's Citizenship and 
Immigration Minister at the News Conference Regarding Canada's Asylum System” (22 January 2014), online: 
<http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=831769>. 
132
 N. Keung, “Roma Refugees: Canadian Billboards in Hungary Warn of Deportation”, Toronto Star (25 January 
2013). 
 Page 21 of 58 
“people who make a claim without sound reasons will be processed faster and removed faster.”133 Only a 
few months earlier, the same town was the site of a march by thousands of Jobbik party supporters, 
wielding torches and chanting “Gypsy crime! Gypsy criminals!”134  
 Ultimately, all of this combined - the anti-Roma rhetoric in Canada, low success rates in 
Hungarian Romani refugee claims, and the revised refugee determination process - significantly reduced 
the number of Hungarian refugee claims made in Canada (from an average of over 2,000 per year 
between 2008 and 2012 to under 200 in 2013), notwithstanding the alarming growth in anti-Roma 
activities in Hungary. In other words, we seem to be at the end of the most recent stream of Hungarian 
Romani migration to Canada.  
 With this context in mind, we will now turn to our study of refugee claims decided in the context 
of the most recent stream of Hungarian Romani migration to Canada. 
  
3. THE STUDY: HUNGARIAN ROMANI REFUGEE CLAIMS (2008-2012)  
3.1. Methodology  
 Empirical research about Canadian refugee-law decision-making must confront several 
methodological challenges. The most significant challenges are that refugee hearings are closed to the 
public
135
 and that only a small and non-representative proportion of IRB refugee determinations are 
published.
136
 As a result, standard legal-research methodologies - i.e., obtaining relevant cases from legal 
databases and analyzing those cases - do not allow full explorations of decision-making in this area.  
 For this study, we used several empirical methodologies to overcome these limitations. We began 
by reading government statements, media accounts, and academic commentary relating to Hungarian 
Romani refugee claims in Canada. Next, we reviewed all published IRB and Federal Court refugee 
decisions involving Hungarian Romani claimants during the period of the study. These materials provided 
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us with a general understanding of the more visible challenges that Hungarian Roma faced in the refugee 
determination system. Our next step was to conduct ten semi-structured interviews with staff at non-
governmental organizations and with refugee lawyers who had personal knowledge of the experience of 
Hungarian Romani refugee claimants. We transcribed the interviews and analyzed the transcripts for 
common themes. We also made access-to-information requests to the IRB, seeking statistics on refugee-
claim outcomes as well as large datasets from the IRB’s database regarding thousands of individual cases 
(the data requested included the file number, country, outcome, date of outcome, name of decision-maker, 
name of counsel, etc.). In addition to conducting analysis on this data, we drew on the data to request 
further information from the IRB for selected samples of cases, including unpublished written reasons for 
decisions and documents submitted by claimants. Because quality-of-counsel issues arose early in our 
research, we also asked for copies of all IRB records referring to quality-of-counsel concerns in the 
context of Hungarian Romani refugee claims. 
 For this study, then, we amassed a great deal of information on Canada’s response to Hungarian 
Romani refugee claims between 2008 and 2012, and we conducted both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses on that information.  
 Before we set out the results of those analyses, one methodological limitation in our research 
bears emphasizing: we did not interview Hungarian Romani refugee claimants. Unfortunately, by the time 
we began this study, a large proportion of the claimants that we would have been most interested in 
interviewing either had been removed from Canada or are remaining despite being ordered to leave. 
Interviewing such claimants would have posed both practical and ethical challenges, and we decided not 
to pursue such interviews. That having been said, we are mindful of the dangers of academic research on 
marginalized communities that does not accord attention to the voices of members of those communities. 
We hope that other scholars will supplement our research with methodologies that do a better job of 
foregrounding the voices of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants. 
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3.2. Statistical Overview  
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 Tables 1 and 2 offer statistical overviews of outcomes in refugee claims from Hungary and from 
all countries between 2008 and 2012. The first table includes both principal applicants and their 
dependants (e.g., a family of six making a claim together is counted as six separate decisions). It therefore 
offers a snapshot of all refugee-claim outcomes. The data from this table is drawn from IRB Country 
Reports, which are quarterly statistical summaries prepared by the IRB.
137
 The second table and all 
remaining tables in this article include only data about principal-applicant refugee determinations (e.g., a 
family of six making a claim together is counted as a single decision). Table 2 therefore provides an 
overview of outcomes in all refugee-claim decisions without considering how many individuals were 
affected by any particular decision. The data for this table is based on information contained in various 
fields in the IRB’s database for principal-claimant refugee decisions between 2008 and 2012.138  
 Four points from these statistical overviews are worth emphasizing. 
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 First, as shown in Table 1, Hungary was a significant source country for refugee claimants in 
Canada between 2008 and 2012. In total, 11,333 Hungarian refugee claims were referred to the IRB, 
representing 8.3% of all claims during this period. The number of Hungarian refugee claims increased 
from 2008 to 2011, when it peaked at 4,423 claims, representing 17.7% of all claims made that year. In 
2012, the numbers of claims dropped significantly.
139
 
 Second, Table 1 shows that 660 Hungarians were granted refugee protection in Canada between 
2008 and 2012.
140
 In our view, this figure demonstrates a major problem with the rhetoric of ‘bogus’ 
Hungarian refugee claimants discussed above: disparaging an entire group as ‘bogus’, when hundreds of 
members of that group have been recognized by the IRB as having well-founded fears of persecution, 
compounds the mistreatment of an already-marginalized group of people. 
 Third, as Table 2 indicates, it was rare for the IRB to declare that refugee claims from Hungary 
had no credible basis. The IRB is required to make such a declaration in denying a refugee claim when it 
is of the view “that there was no credible or trustworthy evidence on which it could have made a 
favourable decision.”141 Only 1.3% of Hungarian refugee determinations were declared to have no 
credible basis, a figure somewhat lower than the equivalent figure for all countries during the same period 
(1.9%). This is further evidence against assertions that Hungarian refugee claims during this period were 
‘bogus’. 
 Fourth, it must be acknowledged that large numbers of Hungarian refugee claims were not 
successful between 2008 and 2012. As shown in Table 1, the recognition rate for all Hungarian refugee 
claimants decided on their merits was 18.1%. This compares to a 47.2% recognition rate for claimants 
from all countries during the same period. In addition, 52.5% of Hungarian refugee claims were not 
decided on their merits because they were declared abandoned or withdrawn. This is an unusually high 
abandonment/withdrawal rate, as the equivalent figure for claimants from all countries is only 18.3%. 
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Taken together, between 2008 and 2012, only 8.6% of finalized Hungarian principal applicant refugee 
determinations resulted in the claimant being accorded refugee protection, whereas 38.5% of claimants 
from all countries succeeded overall. In other words, while it is incorrect to make blanket statements 
about Hungarian claims being ‘bogus’, it would be fair to say that, in a large majority of Hungarian 
refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012, claimants did not obtain refugee protection. 
 The rest of this article explores both the causes and the implications of the patterns evident in 
these two tables.  
 
3.3. Claim Type  
 In debates about Hungarian refugee claims, there has been some dispute about whether, in 
speaking about these claims, one is essentially speaking about Hungarian Romani claimants. The reason 
for the controversy is that, as discussed above, political actors often singled out Hungarian refugee 
claimants as making ‘bogus’ claims with the intent of abusing Canadian social programs. In doing so, 
some political actors were careful to avoid speaking explicitly about Hungarian Roma.
142
 Nonetheless, 
because everyone hearing such statements understood that most Hungarian refugee claimants are Romani, 
these political actors were able to convey the message that Hungarian Roma were abusing the refugee 
determination system while avoiding saying this outright. This is significant because, had these actors 
referred explicitly to Roma, they would have been exposed to claims of racism and of drawing on the 
same stereotypes that animate anti-Roma sentiments in countries like Hungary. 
 Unfortunately, the IRB did not systematically gather data on claim type or on the ethnicity of 
refugee claimants during the period of the study. According to data provided in response to access to 
information requests, in the 3,334 Hungarian principal applicant decisions between 2008 and 2012 under 
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consideration in this study, claim type information is available in the IRB’s database for only 81 cases.143 
Of these 81 cases, the claim type is recorded as involving alleged persecution on account of Romani 
ethnicity in 90.1%, on account of gender in 6.1%, and on account of criminality in 3.7% of the cases. This 
would, at first glance, suggest that a high percentage of Hungarian claims between 2008 and 2012 
involved allegations of persecution on account of Romani ethnicity. However, because claim-type 
information is not available in the IRB’s database for the vast majority (97.5%) of Hungarian principal-
applicant refugee claims decided during this period, and because it is unclear to us in what circumstances 
the IRB chose to gather claim type information, we have no way of knowing whether the cases with 
claim-type information available constitute a representative sample of all Hungarian cases decided during 
this period. 
 
 To supplement this potentially unrepresentative sample, we obtained written reasons for decisions 
(and in cases where no written reasons were issued, other documents describing the claim) that allowed us 
to determine the claim type for a random sample of 96 Hungarian principal applicant refugee cases 
decided on their merits between 2008 and 2012.
144
 As can be seen in Table 3, claimants were Romani in 
85.4% of the cases. It should be noted that some of these cases involved multiple grounds of alleged 
persecution (e.g., gender and Romani ethnicity, sexual orientation and Romani ethnicity, etc.). The 
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remaining 14.6% of cases involved various claim types, including gender, sexual orientation, and 
criminality. Interestingly, the recognition rate in cases involving Roma (29.3%) was higher than for the 
other claim types in Hungarian cases in this sample (7.1%). 
 Based both on the cases in the IRB’s database where claim type information is recorded, and on 
the random sample of Hungarian principal-applicant cases decided on the merits that we reviewed, it 
seems clear that the vast majority of refugee claims made in Canada by Hungarians between 2008 and 
2012 involved Romani claimants. Thus, when political actors spoke about Hungarian claimants during 
this period, they were speaking by and large about Hungarian Romani claimants, and their comments 
must be understood in that racialized context. 
 
3.4. Grounds for Denial 
 
 As we have seen, while many Hungarian refugee claimants obtained refugee protection between 
2008 and 2012, many others did not. To understand the reasons offered by the IRB to justify outcomes in 
these claims, we reviewed the written reasons (and where reasons were unavailable, other documents 
describing the claim) in the random sample of 96 Hungarian refugee decisions examined in the previous 
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section. Table 4 sets out the frequency of particular types of reasons, including specific grounds of denial, 
in the 82 refugee claims in our sample that involved Hungarian Roma.
145
  
 
  3.4.1. State Protection 
 The most frequent reason offered for refusing refugee protection in our sample of Hungarian 
Romani refugee claims related to the availability of state protection. To succeed with a refugee claim 
under section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a claimant must demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.
146
 Establishing a well-founded fear of persecution requires, among other things, 
demonstrating that protection by state authorities against the feared persecution is not available in the 
claimant’s home country.147 Case law suggests that, absent a complete state breakdown, state protection is 
presumed to be forthcoming - and, as a result, claimants bear the burden of rebutting this presumption.
148
 
There is also case law suggesting that claimants who come from ‘democratic’ countries bear an especially 
heavy burden, in the sense that it is more difficult to rebut this presumption.
149
 
 As can been seen in Table 4, in 68.3% of our sample of Hungarian Romani decisions (or 96.6% 
of the negative Hungarian Romani decisions), the IRB refused to accord refugee protection at least partly 
because claimants failed to rebut the presumption of state protection. During the 2008-2012 period, 
however, the IRB granted refugee protection to hundreds of Hungarian Roma - including 29.3% of the 
Hungarian Romani cases in our sample. In these cases, claimants successfully rebutted the presumption of 
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state protection. Thus, it would appear that the IRB did not have a consistent answer to the question of 
whether Hungarian authorities offered Roma protection against persecution between 2008 and 2012.  
 In considering the lack of consensus at the IRB regarding the availability of state protection, it is 
important to keep in mind that the characteristics of individual claims may impact the state-protection 
analysis. For example, claimants facing multiple intersecting forms of persecution (e.g., persecution on 
account of both ethnicity and gender) may encounter distinct barriers in accessing state protection. Along 
similar lines, many factors could either facilitate or limit the ability of individual claimants to access state 
protection (e.g., education, language skills, social capital, resources, etc.). Therefore, in analyzing the 
availability of state protection, the IRB must be attentive to the particular circumstances of each claimant. 
As Federal Court Justice Zinn has stated regarding Hungarian Roma cases: “[e]ach decision turns on its 
own facts [...], which explains why many claims are denied on the basis of state protection while others 
succeed, despite being determined on the basis of the same national documentation.”150  
 That having been said, in many of the cases we reviewed, the allegations and evidence of anti-
Roma persecution and the alleged failure of Hungarian authorities to do enough to prevent this 
persecution were similar, and yet the state protection findings varied. Indeed, having reviewed many 
Hungarian Romani IRB and Federal Court cases that address this issue, we often found it impossible to 
differentiate cases that came down on either side of this issue.  
 Part of the problem is that the country-conditions evidence available to the IRB was mixed. 
Federal Court Justice Gagné describes the lack of clarity in Hungarian country-conditions evidence in the 
following terms:  
Quite obviously, the documentary evidence regarding the adequacy of anti-discrimination 
state action in Hungary is contradictory in many respects and the question remains 
unresolved in recent decisions of the Board’s and in this Court’s recent jurisprudence. 
[...] [T]he objective documentary evidence allows for a determination either way.
151
 
 
 In addition to the problem of inconclusive country conditions evidence, there was also 
controversy over the legal test for determining the availability of state protection during the period of our 
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study. This controversy related to the fact that failures in law enforcement are inevitable, and, therefore, 
no country can offer perfect protection to everyone all the time.
152
 Given the inevitability of imperfect 
state protection, the question became how much failure of state protection must be demonstrated to rebut 
the presumption, especially in circumstances where the state is at least attempting to provide protection. 
Case law has proposed a variety of tests to answer this question, including: whether the state is making 
serious efforts at providing protection,
153
 whether those efforts are translating into effective protection,
154
 
whether there is protection at the operational level,
155
 whether the level of protection is adequate,
156
 and 
whether there is operationally adequate protection.
157
 Notice that the focus of these tests varies. Some 
focus on whether the state is trying to provide protection, others focus on whether claimants will actually 
be protected, and still others focus on whether the level of protection meets a particular standard. The 
different focus of these tests is especially significant in the context of Hungarian Romani refugee claims 
because of the mixed evidence noted above. Thus, whether Hungarian Romani claimants were able to 
rebut the presumption of state protection may have depended in part on which of these tests were applied. 
 Given both the contradictory country-conditions evidence and the controversy over the proper 
legal test for assessing that evidence, it is perhaps not surprising that there was no consensus at the IRB as 
to whether Hungarian Roma could reasonably expect protection against persecution in Hungary. 
Moreover, as we have noted, the individual circumstances of claimants further complicate matters, such 
that, even with the same country-conditions evidence and the same legal test, the result of the state-
protection analysis may vary from claimant to claimant. One thing, however, is clear from our sample of 
cases: success in Hungarian Romani refugee claims between 2008 and 2012 appeared to depend largely 
on whether claimants were able to rebut the presumption of state protection. 
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  3.4.2. Discrimination versus persecution 
 Another common reason cited for refusing refugee protection in our sample of Hungarian Romani 
decisions relates to whether claimants feared persecution or discrimination. To meet the refugee definition 
under section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a claimant must show that the 
mistreatment they fear amounts to persecution, which has been defined as serious mistreatment that 
violates core human rights.
158
 For the purposes of the refugee definition, discrimination does not amount 
to persecution, though multiple instances of discrimination and harassment that are not individually 
violations of core human rights may cumulatively amount to persecution.
159
 
 In 30.5% of the cases in our sample of Hungarian Romani refugee decisions (or 43.1% of the 
negative Hungarian Romani refugee decisions), refugee claims were denied at least in part because 
claimants failed to demonstrate that the harm they feared constituted persecution. In virtually all of the 
decisions in our sample, the IRB acknowledged that conditions in Hungary are difficult for Roma. 
However, the IRB often found that the mistreatment personally experienced by the claimants involved 
discrimination that did not reach the level of persecution. These findings regarding discrimination versus 
persecution, however, were seldom determinative. After making such findings, the IRB typically went on 
to consider whether, if returned to Hungary, claimants would face persecution on account of their 
ethnicity despite only having experienced discrimination in the past. This forward-looking risk analysis 
typically turned on the question of state protection. Thus, while discrimination versus persecution was an 
issue in many Hungarian Romani cases in our sample, it was less often determinative than the availability 
of state protection.
160
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  3.4.3. General negative credibility 
 A third common reason offered for refusing refugee protection in our sample related to whether 
claimants were generally credible. Refugee claimants bear the burden of proving that they meet the 
refugee definition.
161
 To try to meet this burden, claimants usually introduce a variety of evidence, 
including general evidence relating to conditions in their home countries and individual evidence that 
corroborates their allegations. In addition to documentary evidence, claimant testimony plays a central 
role in most refugee determinations because documentary evidence is seldom available for many key 
aspects of the stories recounted by claimants.
162
  
 In assessing refugee claimant evidence - including claimant testimony - the IRB is exempt from 
rules of evidence that apply in other areas of law and instead may “receive and base a decision on 
evidence that is [...] considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances.”163 Case law establishes that 
claimant testimony is presumed true unless a good reason exists for doubt, and that, if the IRB doubts 
claimant testimony, it must articulate reasonable justifications for this doubt based on the available 
evidence.
164
 That being said, the standard of proof in refugee law for factual findings is the balance of 
probabilities, and claimants bear the burden of proof, which together mean that claimants must 
demonstrate that they are more likely than not to be credible.
165
 
 In our sample of Hungarian Romani claims, 30.5% of claimants were found to be generally not 
credible. A variety of reasons were offered to support these negative credibility determinations. It was, for 
example, common for the IRB to point out inconsistencies between versions of stories recounted by 
claimants in various stages of the refugee determination process. The IRB frequently pointed to 
contradictions in details between the version of the claimant’s stories told to an immigration officer when 
the refugee claim was first made, the written narrative submitted by the claimant, and claimant testimony 
at the refugee hearing. The IRB also often complained that claimants added important facts during their 
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testimony that, if true, should have been (but were not) included in their written narratives, thus casting 
doubt on whether the testimony was truthful. The IRB also doubted claimant testimony when it was 
considered vague, lacking in detail, or implausible.  
 While general negative credibility determinations were not uncommon in our sample of 
Hungarian Romani decisions, in most cases where the IRB found that the claimants’ stories of 
mistreatment were untrue, the IRB nonetheless went on to consider whether they would face anti-Roma 
persecution if returned to Hungary. This then typically led the IRB to consider the matter of state 
protection - and, as we have seen, in 96.6% of the negative Hungarian Roma decisions in our sample, the 
IRB found that state protection was available. Thus, as with IRB findings related to discrimination versus 
persecution, negative credibility determinations were seldom determinative.
166
  
 It would, therefore, be fair to say that credibility posed challenges for a significant proportion of 
the Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in our sample, even though negative credibility determinations 
were usually not the only grounds for denying claims in these cases. We would also hasten to add, 
however, that in the majority of Hungarian Romani cases in our sample (69.5%), there was no negative 
credibility determination. In our view, the latter provides further evidence against assertions that 
Hungarian Romani refugee claims during this period were ‘bogus’. 
 
  3.4.4. Other grounds of refusal 
 State protection, discrimination versus persecution, and general negative credibility findings 
were, by a substantial margin, the main grounds offered for denying refugee claims in our sample of 
Hungarian Romani cases. We would, however, like to say a little about other grounds of refusal that were 
infrequently or never cited in the cases in our sample. 
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 First, only one Hungarian Romani refugee claim in our sample was denied, in part because the 
claimant had a viable internal flight alternative.
167
 To meet the refugee definition under section 96 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, claimants must establish a well-founded fear of persecution 
throughout their entire country. If refugee claimants can avoid persecution by relocating to another region 
of their country, and if conditions are such that it would not be unreasonable to expect relocation, then 
their claims will be denied due to the availability of an internal flight alternative.
168
 The only Hungarian 
Romani claim in our sample denied partly on the basis of an internal flight alternative involved a claimant 
who alleged that he faced anti-Roma persecution in the small town in which he lived.
169
 The IRB found 
that he could reasonably relocate to Budapest where, if he faced mistreatment on the basis of his ethnicity, 
he could approach Hungarian authorities for protection.
170
 Thus, the one Hungarian Romani case in our 
sample denied partly on the basis of an internal flight alternative could also be considered a state 
protection finding (i.e., state protection was available to the claimant in the proposed internal flight 
alternative). It would, therefore, seem that the availability of an internal flight alternative was not a major 
impediment for most Hungarian Romani refugee claimants during the period of our study.  
 Second, no Hungarian Romani refugee claims in our sample were denied on the basis that, as 
nationals of an EU country, claimants could relocate to another EU country to avoid persecution in 
Hungary.
171
 In other words, none of the claims in our sample were denied on the basis of an “external 
flight alternative.”172 The fact that no claims were denied on this basis reflects that the refugee definition 
only requires a well-founded fear of persecution in the claimant’s country or countries of nationality,173 
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not in other countries to which they could potentially relocate without automatically enjoying citizenship 
rights.
174
 We raise this point because EU mobility rights often arise in debates about Hungarian Romani 
refugee claims, but as a legal matter, such mobility rights are irrelevant.
175
 Moreover, even if EU mobility 
rights were legally relevant, it should be noted that Hungarian Roma may not, in fact, be able to safely 
relocate to other EU countries. To begin with, there are restrictions on EU mobility rights,
176
 and many 
Roma were deported from EU countries for failing to comply with these restrictions during the period of 
our study.
177
 In addition, it is questionable whether Hungarian Roma would be protected against 
persecution even with legal status in some other EU countries.
178
 
 Third, none of the Hungarian Romani refugee claims in our sample were denied on the basis that 
claimants failed to establish that they were, in fact, Romani. Indeed, the matter seldom arose at all. Very 
few cases explicitly addressed why the IRB believed the claimant’s assertions about their Romani 
ethnicity, and no cases explicitly disbelieved those assertions. Although the matter did not arise in our 
sample, it has arisen in reported cases,
179
 and the Federal Court has cautioned against resorting to 
“stereotypes and assumptions” to assess Romani ethnicity and urged decision-makers not to “fixate on 
skin, hair and eye colour, which demonstrates minimal understanding of ethnicity.”180 At any rate, based 
on our sample, failure to substantiate a Hungarian Romani identity does not appear to be a common 
reason for refusing refugee protection. 
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  Fourth, none of the cases in our sample of Hungarian Romani refugee claims were refused due to 
exclusion provisions. Under these provisions, a person who would otherwise meet the refugee definition 
can be excluded from refugee protection on the basis of having committed serious non-political crimes 
outside Canada, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or acts that are contrary to the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations.
181
 Given the frequency with which criminality arises as a theme in 
debates about Hungarian Romani refugee claims, we think it is worth emphasizing that, based on our 
sample, it appears that Hungarian Romani refugee claimants were seldom excluded from refugee 
protection due to serious criminality between 2008 and 2012. 
 
3.5. Institutional Bias 
 We were curious about whether, beyond the legal reasons identified in the previous section, there 
were other factors that affected outcomes in Hungarian Romani refugee claims during the period of our 
study. To begin answering this question, we asked ten interviewees (five lawyers and five staff members 
at non-governmental organizations with experience assisting Hungarian Roma in navigating the refugee-
determination system) what they thought accounted for low success rates in Hungarian Romani refugee 
claims. Eight of the ten interviewees raised concerns related to institutional bias against Hungarian Roma 
at the IRB.
182
  
 In explaining how this institutional bias operates, several interviewees suggested that decision-
makers at the IRB were influenced by negative portrayals of Hungarian Roma as ‘bogus’ refugee 
claimants, particularly through negative comments made by Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
Jason Kenney. For example: 
[T]he acceptance rate used to be rather high... And then when the Minister began the 
public defamation of the Roma, that they were frauds and cheats and here for economic 
reasons, the numbers just dropped dramatically. So part of the problem was the political 
voice of prejudice.
183
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[T]he Minister started to speak about the Roma claims, and talking about bogus refugee 
claims [...]. [This] rhetoric had to have had a chilling effect on the board members.
184
  
 
[I]t’s very difficult to believe that the refugee board could be completely shielded from 
the political opinion of the Minister [...] The discrimination faced by the Roma obviously 
is, even apart from what the Minister says, one of those baseline factors that is bound to 
affect all but a few particularly scrupulous Board Members. I think it’s just sort of there, 
in the culture.
185
 
 
 Another interviewee went further, contending not only that decision-makers were subconsciously 
influenced by negative portrayals of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants, but also that some may have 
denied these claims out of concern for their careers.
186
 That interviewee noted that, during the period of 
our study, IRB decision-makers were appointed and re-appointed through processes largely controlled by 
the Minister.
187
 As a result, this argument runs, decision-makers may have avoided granting Hungarian 
Romani refugee claims partly out of fear that they would not be re-appointed. In this interviewee’s words, 
“I think it had a chilling effect and it sent a message to the Board Members that if you want to be 
renewed, you toe the party line.”188  
 Another institutional-bias argument raised by some interviewees related to decision-makers 
copying long passages from reasons for denying other Hungarian Romani cases rather than writing unique 
reasons engaging with the specific circumstances of each case: 
You see a lot of the decisions tend to copy each other for precedents [...] finding that 
there is protection, [that] Roma don’t face persecution, and so on [...]. And certainly those 
precedents are coming from somewhere, even if it’s from other Members but definitely it 
looked like there was a… I don’t know if it’s enough to establish institutional bias in the 
legal sense but definitely there was bias on the part of the IRB to want to refuse those 
claims.
189
 
 
[Decision-makers] may take shortcuts. [...] [I]nstead of looking at the country evidence 
[...] and reading it in the context of each case [...] you end up cutting and pasting [...] [and 
you] have cookie-cutter reasons. [...] [I]nstead of spending [...] 20 hours reading the 
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documents, they look at precedents from colleagues and say “well ok this is how we do 
it”, so that kind of perpetuates the boilerplate reasons.190 
 
 In considering the views expressed by our interviewees about institutional bias, it is worth 
recalling our earlier discussion of Canada’s response to the first stream of Hungarian Roma from 1998 to 
2002.
191
 As noted, the 1998 Hungarian Roma lead case - which severely reduced success rates for 
Hungarian Romani refugee claimants - was overturned in 2006 by the Federal Court of Appeal on the 
basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.
192
 The court found that it was reasonable to infer that the lead 
case was “tainted” by a motivation “to reduce the percentage of positive decisions in claims for refugee 
status by Hungarian Roma” and was “calculated to deter Roma from leaving for Canada in order to claim 
refugee status.”193 
 If this type of institutional bias against Hungarian Romani refugee claimants existed at the IRB in 
1998, could there, as most of our interviewees suggest, have been a similar bias between 2008 and 2012? 
We believe there are good reasons to be concerned about this possibility. 
 As we have seen, during the period of this study, cracking down on alleged abuse of the refugee-
determination system was a major policy objective of the government, and Hungarian Roma were 
repeatedly held up as the prime example of this alleged abuse. At the same time, Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration Jason Kenney demonstrated that he held little regard for institutional independence. One 
especially troubling incident involved a speech in which Minister Kenney criticized Federal Court judges 
for second-guessing the decisions of immigration officials and for failing to enthusiastically embrace the 
government’s efforts to toughen the immigration and refugee system.194 In response, Canadian Bar 
Association President Rod Snow suggested that public criticism by a cabinet minister of “judges who 
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follow the law but not the government’s political agenda is an affront to our democracy and freedoms”195 
- a view echoed by Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin.
196
 In this context, would 
it be surprising if decision-makers at the IRB, who, unlike judges, did not enjoy security of tenure, felt 
pressure to adhere to the views of the Minister on whose good graces their careers depended? 
 There is also other evidence that provides cause for concern with regard to institutional bias. In 
our sample of Hungarian Romani refugee decisions, lengthy passages were often copied word for word 
from other decisions - with no indication that these passages were copied. Moreover, a document that we 
obtained from the IRB through an access-to-information request indicates that Hungarian Romani 
decisions were circulated among decision-makers at the IRB.
197
 That document, which is undated, was 
written by someone involved in managing a team of decision-makers at the IRB - likely a Coordinating 
Member - working on Hungarian refugee claims. The document discusses meetings that occurred when a 
second team of decision-makers was assigned to hear Hungarian refugee claims:  
[I]n order to have consistency and no variance [we] held a joint meeting to discuss the 
issues [and] also provided CM [the Coordinating Member of the other team] with several 
decisions of my team that had been upheld by [the] Federal Court -- which the new team 
found useful.
198
  
 
 There are, to be sure, good reasons for decision-makers working on similar cases to share 
decisions, most notably in order to enhance consistency in decision-making. However, there are also 
serious risks posed by this practice, especially in a context where the decisions are not publicly available, 
as is the case for most refugee determinations. One risk is related to a bias in favor of decisions denying 
refugee protection. Most positive decisions during the period of our study did not have written reasons,
199
 
thus the circulated reasons were more likely to be negative precedents than positive precedents. Along 
similar lines, if the circulated decisions were selected because they had been upheld on judicial review, 
they were even more likely to be precedents for denying refugee claims because only a handful of 
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positive refugee decisions are judicially reviewed.
200
 If these mostly negative decisions were circulated 
among decision-makers - and then substantially copied without attribution - then the decisions essentially 
played the same role as the 1998 lead case - that is to say, they offered non-binding guidance in 
Hungarian Romani cases in a manner that reduced success rates in these cases. The most troubling aspect 
of this non-binding guidance is that it is non-transparent. Those outside the IRB have no idea what cases 
have been circulated internally, and there is no oversight to ensure that these cases offer a fair 
representation of a particular group of claims. This lack of transparency is compounded when decision-
makers, guided by these disproportionately negative cases, fail to provide copies of the cases to claimants 
in advance - arguably breaching the claimant’s constitutional right to know the case against them and to 
offer a response.
201
  
 In our view, if a decision-maker wishes to draw on unpublished refugee cases, at a minimum, 
those unpublished cases should be communicated in advance to the claimant, who should have an 
opportunity to explain whether their circumstances can be differentiated. Moreover, to avoid the 
perception of institutional bias, it is essential that both negative and positive precedents be shared with 
decision-makers and with claimants. Unfortunately, it seems likely that neither of these conditions were 
met with regard to Hungarian Romani refugee claims during the period of this study. Moreover, this 
occurred in a context where decision-makers might - in light of Minister Kenney’s negative comments - 
reasonably be concerned about their career prospects should they grant large numbers of Hungarian 
Romani refugee claims. Taken together, we agree with our interviewees that there are good reasons to be 
worried about the fairness and impartiality of decision-making regarding Hungarian Romani refugee 
claims during this period.  
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3.6. Consistency at the Immigration and Refugee Board 
 While institutional bias at the IRB is a concern, partly due to problematic practices aimed at 
enhancing consistency in decision-making, there also appear to be serious problems relating to 
inconsistent decision-making during the same period. As already discussed, the reasons offered by the 
IRB for outcomes in Hungarian Romani refugee claims involve some degree of inconsistency, most 
notably with regard to conflicting findings on the availability of state protection. In addition to these sorts 
of inconsistencies, several of our interviewees raised concerns about troubling inconsistencies in patterns 
of decisions made by particular decision-makers.
202
 As one interviewee put it: “The big disparity is in 
who the judge is. There are judges who don’t give positives and there are judges who give positives.”203 
 One way to assess these impressions regarding disparities in decision-making across adjudicators 
is to look at variations in recognition rates.
204
 Using data obtained through an access-to-information 
request,
205
 we examined two sets of variations in recognition rates in all principal-applicant Hungarian 
refugee claims between 2008 and 2012: one involving variations across IRB offices, and the other 
involving variations across individual decision-makers. 
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 Table 5 describes outcomes in Hungarian principal-applicant refugee claims (broken down by the 
region where the claim was filed) decided between 2008 and 2012. As the table shows, 84.3% of the 
3,334 principal applicant Hungarian refugee claims finalized during this period were filed in Central 
Region (Ontario) - compared to only 8.2% filed in Western Region and 7.6% in Eastern Region. The table 
also indicates that recognition rates and overall success rates in these cases varied significantly across 
regions. Hungarian principal applicants were 2.0 times as likely to succeed overall in Western Region 
(11.8%) compared to applicants in Central region (5.8%), and they were 2.7 times as likely to succeed in 
Eastern Region (15.8%) compared to Central Region (5.8%). Of course, one should be cautious about 
inferring that the variations are caused by regional differences in decision-making practices, as there 
could be a number of other factors at play. That being said, the large variations do raise questions about 
whether a case that would succeed in one region may nonetheless fail in another. 
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 Table 6 provides details on the outcomes in principal-applicant Hungarian refugee claims 
finalized on their merits between 2008 and 2012, broken down by the IRB Member making the decision. 
As illustrated in the table, 21 IRB Members deciding at least 20 cases each adjudicated the large majority 
(78.2%) of these cases. The table also shows very large variations in recognition rates depending on 
which IRB Member decided the case, even when only comparing IRB Members working in the same 
office. Thus, for example, in the Toronto office, claimants were in luck if their cases were assigned to 
Lesley Mason (50.0%, 28 cases), Robert Barafo (33.3%, 45 cases) or David Lowe (27.1%, 48 cases). 
However they were decidedly unlucky if their cases were assigned to Michelle Pettinella (0%, 96 cases), 
Edward Robinson (0%, 49 cases) or David McBean (0%, 24 cases).  
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 Given these dramatic variations in grant rates between decision-makers in the same office hearing 
claims from the same country, we think there are good reasons to worry that outcomes in some cases 
depended to a significant degree on who was assigned to hear the case. This obviously raises serious 
fairness concerns. 
 
3.7. Quality of Counsel  
 Fairness problems in Hungarian Romani refugee claims are not, however, related solely to the 
actions of government officials or institutions such as the IRB. Some of these problems instead involve 
professionals who are supposed to act in the best interests of refugee claimants. Indeed, all ten of our 
interviewees expressed serious concerns about quality of counsel in Hungarian Romani refugee claims. 
The following comments are typical: 
[M]any lawyers make quite a big deal about who are the refugee judges, the process, the panel 
members, all that. But I think the single most important thing is the lawyers.
206
 
 
There were some counsel who took a large number of claims [and] poorly prepared them [...]. I 
think that could go a long way as well to explaining the low approval rate.
207
 
 
[T]here seemed to be representatives who [...] weren’t interested in [...] doing a good job or in 
truthfully or honestly representing their clients.
208
 
 
[T]here are some really terrible lawyers out there.
209
 
 
 The interviewees also largely agreed about the specific types of quality-of-counsel issues that 
arose in Hungarian Romani refugee claims. Many of these issues related to claimant narratives, which are 
key documents submitted early in the refugee-determination process that set out the claimant’s account of 
his or her fears of persecution. All ten interviewees indicated that some lawyers prepared inadequate 
narratives, including brief boilerplate narratives that failed to address central aspects of the claims, for 
Hungarian Romani clients. Interviewees also reported that lawyers frequently left claimants to prepare 
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their own narratives without adequate instruction,
210
 asked clients to sign blank narratives,
211
 and failed to 
review narratives with clients prior to submitting them.
212
 Some interviewees also suggested that other 
supporting documents, such as country-conditions information, medical reports, and police reports, were 
not submitted despite being provided to counsel,
213
 and that counsel failed to instruct clients on what 
types of supporting documents they should seek out.
214
 
 Another common set of quality-of-counsel concerns raised by our interviewees related to how 
lawyers set up their practice. Several interviewees, for example, expressed concern about high volumes of 
cases taken on by some lawyers.
215
 Many also suggested that lawyers relied excessively on non-lawyer 
assistants - including translators or consultants - or on inexperienced junior lawyers.
216
 In addition, some 
interviewees reported that clients were often unable to reach their lawyers,
217
 were not adequately 
prepared by their lawyers for their hearings,
218
 or never met with their lawyers until their refugee 
hearings.
219
 Some also indicated that lawyers failed to even show up at hearings.
220
 
 We were curious about whether these concerns about quality of counsel were shared by the IRB, 
so we made an access-to-information request seeking records that referred to quality of counsel or 
inadequate representation involving Hungarian refugee claims during the period of our study.
221
 The IRB 
provided over 1,000 pages of various types of documents responsive to our request. Among these 
documents were emails written by decision-makers and staff at the IRB outlining problematic behavior of 
counsel. For example, in the context of allegations about a law firm allegedly failing to forward important 
documents to the IRB, a staff member asked whether a complaint should be made about the 
“mismanagement” of the firm, and noted that decision-makers “often run into problems stemming [from] 
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the firm’s internal administration.”222 Similarly, an email from an IRB Member described a hearing that 
had been postponed because of allegations of inadequate counsel. These allegations included many of the 
concerns about narratives raised by our interviewees. The email concludes: “As you know this has 
happened repeatedly on the Hungarian cases. [...] I have heard a number of times that the [narrative] is not 
one the claimants have seen. It is evident to me from the [narratives] that a template is being used over 
and over.”223 In addition to electronic correspondence, the IRB provided us with other documents 
detailing steps taken to reduce delays in the refugee-determination process caused by problematic counsel 
in Hungarian cases,
224
 as well as documents from many Hungarian refugee claims featuring allegations of 
inadequate counsel.
225
 
 
 The concerns regarding quality of counsel expressed by our interviewees and by the IRB are 
consistent with our quantitative data. Using information obtained from the IRB for counsel of record 
listed in all Hungarian principal-applicant refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012, we examined 
whether outcomes varied depending on who served as counsel of record. Table 7 shows that success rates 
were higher when counsel of record worked on relatively few Hungarian claims compared to counsel who 
worked on large numbers of such claims. For example, claimants represented by counsel involved in ten 
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or fewer Hungarian cases were 2.9 times as likely to succeed compared to claimants represented by 
counsel in 201 or more Hungarian cases. The table also shows that a small number of high-volume 
lawyers were involved in a significant proportion of Hungarian refugee claims decided in this period: 
34.2% of these cases involved just three counsel, and 52.5% involved eight counsel. 
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 Tables 8 and 9 break down the success rates for individual counsel of record who were involved 
in at least 25 Hungarian principal-applicant refugee claims between 2008 and 2012. As these tables show, 
the success rates of individual counsel in Hungarian cases vary significantly, even when comparing 
counsel working in a single province. For example, in Ontario, Jeffrey Goldman (25.8%, 31 cases), 
Maureen Silcoff (13.5%, 52 cases) and Peter Ivanyi (10.8%, 249 cases) succeeded far more frequently 
than Elizabeth Jaszi (1.1%, 95 cases), Viktor Hohots (1.2%, 504 cases) and Djawid Taheri (1.4%, 73 
cases). Of course, as with variations in recognition rates across IRB offices, one should be cautious about 
drawing inferences about the causes of these variations - and in particular about whether differences in 
counsel success rates are a product of differing quality of legal representation. We acknowledge that there 
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are many factors that might produce these variations. Nonetheless, the combination of significantly 
below-average success rates and very high volumes of cases does, in our view, raise serious concerns.
226
 
 Another troubling finding evident in Tables 8 and 9 is that three of the six highest-volume 
lawyers (including the two highest-volume lawyers), who were, together, listed as counsel of record in 
29.6% of the Hungarian principal-applicant refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012, are 
currently facing disciplinary proceedings at the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC). All three have 
below-average success rates in Hungarian claims, and two have the lowest overall success rates in 
Hungarian claims of all lawyers listed as counsel of record in at least 25 such claims. The main 
allegations against all three lawyers in the LSUC proceedings involve inadequate legal service provided 
to multiple refugee-claimant clients. Viktor Hohots and Elizabeth Jaszi are accused of, among other 
things, failing to properly prepare documents submitted by refugee claimants (especially narratives setting 
out the basis of claims), asking claimants to sign blank documents, missing deadlines, failing to prepare 
clients for their refugee hearings, and failing to keep clients advised as to the status of their files.
227
 
Joseph Farkas is accused of having failed to properly supervise a non-lawyer who prepared refugee 
claims in his office and of failing to properly serve several refugee-claimant clients.
228
  
 It should be emphasized that the allegations in these disciplinary proceedings have not yet been 
proven. However, in Galyas v Canada (MCI), the Federal Court found that the highest-volume lawyer, 
Viktor Hohots, provided incompetent counsel.
229
 Specifically, the court found that Mr. Hohots’ law office 
provided incompetent legal counsel in submitting a vague and very brief narrative in a Hungarian Romani 
refugee claim: 
[T]here can be no disputing the inadequacies that appear on the face of the [...] narrative 
[...]. Competent counsel would have known that the Applicant’s narrative does not 
comply with [...] expectations [...] and that it would be extremely detrimental to the 
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Applicant at the hearing. [...] [The IRB] consistently and relentlessly draws negative 
credibility findings from a failure to include important incidents [...]. In that regard, the 
Applicant’s [narrative] is a negative credibility finding waiting to happen.230 
 
 
 Because of the frequent concerns expressed about the quality of narratives submitted by high-
volume counsel in Hungarian claims, we made an access-to-information request to obtain copies of 
narratives submitted in samples of Hungarian refugee claims.
231
 Table 10 sets out the word counts in five 
samples. The first four samples were randomly selected from Hungarian cases in which the four highest-
volume counsel were listed as counsel of record, and the fifth sample was randomly selected from all 
Hungarian principal-applicant cases, irrespective of who was listed as counsel of record. As is evident in 
the table, the narratives submitted in cases where Viktor Hohots or Joseph Farkas was listed as counsel 
were very brief (509 words on average) compared to the narratives in cases where Peter Ivanyi or Roger 
Bhatti were listed as counsel (1,690 words on average). This is a point of some concern, given that the 
former had below-average recognition rates and are facing LSUC disciplinary proceedings. The table also 
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indicates that, in our sample of Hungarian cases with all counsel, positive cases had on average much 
longer narratives (1,633 words) than negative cases (987 words). 
 In addition to these troubling quantitative findings, we must say that we were unimpressed with 
the quality of large numbers of narratives in our samples. In particular, we believe that most of the brief 
narratives suffer from the same flaws that led the Federal Court to call the narrative submitted in Galyas 
inadequate on its face. Indeed, many of these narratives appear to have been prepared with complete 
disregard for what would need to be established at a refugee hearing in order for a claimant to succeed. 
Most of the brief narratives fail to address what steps claimants took to try to obtain state protection 
against persecution in Hungary, or alternatively, why they reasonably believed that taking such steps 
would be futile. As such, these narratives make it extremely difficult for the claimant to rebut the 
presumption of state protection, which, as we saw above, is the main reason offered by the IRB for 
rejecting Hungarian Romani refugee claims. Most of the brief narratives also fail to set out in sufficient 
detail the mistreatment suffered by the claimants, even though they hint at such mistreatment. Therefore, 
they are likely to result in a finding that the claimants suffered discrimination rather than persecution, 
which is, as we saw above, another common reason for the IRB to reject Hungarian Romani refugee 
claims. Finally, most of the brief narratives contain allegations that are vague and incomplete, and are 
thus, to use the Federal Court’s words in Galyas, “negative credibility finding[s] waiting to happen.”232 In 
other words, most of the brief narratives we reviewed were inadequate to the task that any experienced 
counsel should have known would be central to success in the claim: rebutting the presumption of state 
protection, demonstrating that the claimant faced persecution rather than discrimination, and establishing 
that the claimant is credible. 
 Based both on the patterns in success rates and on our review of the samples of narratives, we are 
of the view that there was a serious and systemic problem regarding quality of counsel in large numbers 
of Hungarian Romani refugee claims during the period of our study - and, in particular, that many 
narratives were prepared by counsel in a manner that virtually guaranteed that the refugee claims would 
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fail. We therefore agree with all of our interviewees that quality of counsel likely played a significant role 
in the very low success rates for Hungarian Romani refugee claimants between 2008 and 2012. 
   
3.8. Abandoned and Withdrawn Claims  
 A final aspect of Hungarian Romani refugee claims made in Canada between 2008 and 2012 that 
we would like to explore is the frequency of withdrawn or abandoned claims - with the former meaning 
that claimants actively asked the IRB to discontinue their claims, and the latter meaning that the IRB 
declared claims abandoned after claimants failed to complete a mandatory step in the process. During the 
period of this study, withdrawal/ abandonment rates in Hungarian Romani claims played a prominent role 
in debates both about these claims and about Canada’s refugee determination system more generally. For 
example, in 2010, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney, speaking in Parliament about 
the need for reforms to Canada’s refugee determination system, said:  
[T]he system [...] is broken [...] with our number one source country [i.e. Hungary], a 
European Union democracy, from which 97% of claimants go on to abandon or withdraw 
their own claims. Therefore, it is imperative that we find a way to deter abuse [...] [of] 
Canada’s generosity.233 
 
Similarly, in another statement in Parliament the same year, Minister Kenney said: 
[Hungary] has become our number one source country for asylum claims. Ninety-seven 
per cent [...] go on to abandon or withdraw their claims after they are filed saying by their 
own admission that they actually do not need Canada’s protection. [...] Of the 3% of 
claims that went on to adjudication at the IRB, three, not 3%, but three of the 2,500 
asylum claims from Hungary were accepted as being in need of protection. That is an 
acceptance rate of nearly 0%.
234
 
 
 These statistics frequently cited by Minister Kenney were misleading. The full figures are 
available in Table 1, above. As can be seen in this table, the Minister was correct to say that, in 2009, the 
abandonment and withdrawal rate was 97% of finalized Hungarian decisions, and that of all the 
Hungarian cases finalized, only three succeeded with their applications. However, he neglected to 
mention that the IRB chose to hold hearings on the merits in only eight Hungarian cases in 2009 - and 
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that three of those eight cases succeeded. That means that the recognition rate for Hungarian refugee 
claims in 2009 was 37.5%. Moreover, if one looks to the recognition rates for the year before, when more 
Hungarian cases were decided on their merits, Hungarian claimants succeeded in 62.9% of cases decided 
on the merits. This is a rather far cry from the “acceptance rate of nearly 0%” cited by the Minister. 
Moreover, of the approximately 2,500 cases from Hungary before the IRB in 2009, only 267 (around 
10%) were withdrawn or abandoned that year. The rest were simply pending. In other words, the statistics 
that the Minister frequently pointed to as evidence of abuse of Canada’s refugee determination system by 
Hungarian claimants were themselves ‘bogus’. 
 Still, as we have acknowledged, a large proportion (52.5%) of the 7,669 Hungarian refugee 
claims finalized between 2008 and 2012 were withdrawn or abandoned. This is much higher than the 
average abandonment/withdrawal rate for claims from all countries finalized during the same period 
(18.3%). As a result, any serious analysis of Hungarian Romani refugee claims during this period must 
address this phenomenon. 
 We put the question of what accounts for high abandonment/withdrawal rates to our interviewees. 
The most frequent explanation our interviewees offered was that, confronted with very low success rates 
for Hungarian refugee claimants reported in the media, many lost hope that their claims would be 
successful and decided that it was not worth waiting for the refugee-determination process to run its 
course.
235
 As one interviewee put it: “I’ve talked to people who just gave up hope. [...] [T]hey just said 
‘look, we’ve seen the statistics, we’ve read the newspapers, we’ve heard and there’s no hope for us 
here.’”236  
 Several interviewees also suggested that this sense of hopelessness was compounded by Minister 
Kenney’s negative comments about Hungarian refugee claimants.237 For example, one interviewee 
explained that “[t]wo and a half years is a long time to wait for a hearing in an environment where the 
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Minister’s saying you’re bogus, we’re going to reject you anyway.”238 Another interviewee went further, 
saying  
[w]hat encouraged people to give up was the language of people being called bogus 
refugees and criminals, because they felt they weren’t accepted or wanted in Canada, that 
they were being essentially treated the same way as they were being treated back home in 
Hungary.
239
  
 
 Another set of reasons that our interviewees offered for claims being withdrawn or abandoned 
related to counsel, including some of the concerns around quality of counsel addressed in the prior section 
of this article.
240
 For example: 
[The] biggest reason that I see [...] [was] lawyers and immigration consultants not doing 
their job in terms of helping prepare people for their claims [...] [I]t seems like they just 
abandon them.
241
 
 
[L]ack of communication with the lawyers might have made people feel that there’s no 
hope for the case, that no one’s really helping them, that their cases aren’t seen as 
worthwhile.
242
 
 
 [T]hey were treated [badly] by lawyers or by professionals, that was often times very, 
very discouraging and very sad, and they decided to go back.
243
 
 
 These concerns about counsel seem consistent with our quantitative data. As can be seen in Table 
7, above, claimants with high-volume counsel were much more likely to abandon or withdraw their 
claims than claimants with lower-volume counsel (e.g., 68.0% for counsel in 201 or more Hungarian 
cases compared to 33.0% for counsel in two to ten Hungarian cases). Moreover, as is evident in Tables 8 
and 9, abandonment and withdrawal rates for individual high-volume lawyers vary significantly. For 
instance, three high-volume counsel currently facing LSUC disciplinary proceedings, Elizabeth Jaszi 
(84.2%, 95 cases), Viktor Hohots (80.0%, 504 cases), and Joseph Farkas (57.8%, 386 cases), had much 
higher abandonment/withdrawal rates than other high-volume counsel, such as Jeffrey Goldman (29.0%, 
31 cases) and Maureen Silcoff (30.8%, 52 cases). Moreover, the three high-volume lawyers facing LSUC 
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disciplinary proceedings served as counsel of record in 35.4% of all abandoned and withdrawn Hungarian 
refugee claims between 2008 and 2012. In our view - and in light of our conclusions in the last section - 
these figures raise serious concerns about the possible role of quality-of-counsel problems in the large 
numbers of Hungarian refugee claims withdrawn or abandoned during the period of our study. 
 In addition to a sense of hopelessness and concerns about quality of counsel, our interviewees 
also pointed to a variety of other reasons for Hungarian claimants abandoning and withdrawing claims. 
These included difficult living conditions in Canada that did not live up to the claimants’ expectations,244 
homesickness
245
 and culture shock.
246
 Several of the reasons offered involved concerns about family. For 
example, one interviewee reported that claimants withdrew or abandoned their claims after other family 
members were deported from Canada.
247
 Along similar lines, another interviewee suggested that 
claimants withdrew or abandoned claims because they needed to return to Hungary to deal with the illness 
and death of family members.
248
  
 Finally, a number of our interviewees pointed out that many Hungarian Romani refugee claimants 
who abandoned or withdrew claims did not ultimately move back to Hungary, but instead went to other 
European Union countries
249
 - even if, as noted earlier in this article, their legal status in these countries 
might have been precarious. 
 Taken together, we think the phenomenon of high abandonment/withdrawal rates (but not as high 
as misleadingly suggested by Minister Kenney) is more complex than Minister Kenney’s assertions about 
these claims being ‘bogus’ would have it. There were a variety of reasons why claimants may have 
withdrawn or abandoned their claims that have little to do with whether the claimants did, in fact, have a 
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well-founded fear of persecution in Hungary - not the least of which is what one of our interviewees 
called Minister Kenney’s “campaign against refugees and particularly Roma refugees.”250 
  
4. CONCLUSION  
 As this study has shown, between 2008 and 2012, over 11,000 Hungarians made refugee claims 
in Canada, primarily on the basis that they feared persecution on account of their Romani ethnicity. While 
hundreds succeeded with their refugee claims, most did not. Instead, they encountered racist rhetoric that 
drew on stereotypes about Roma being fraudsters, beggars, and criminals, and which presented Hungarian 
Romani refugee claimants as ‘bogus’. These stereotypes have now been enshrined in Canada’s new 
refugee-determination process, which limits the procedural and substantive rights of refugee claimants 
from designated countries of origin, including Hungary, on the theory that asylum seekers from these 
countries are taking advantage of Canadian generosity.  
 Our study has also found that Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in Canada between 2008 and 
2012 encountered a refugee-determination process for which there are reasons to be concerned about 
institutional bias. The same refugee-determination process also appears to have been unable to deliver 
consistent decision-making - and there is good reason to fear that outcomes came down to the luck of the 
draw in terms of which decision-maker was assigned to hear the case. Moreover, many Hungarian 
Romani refugee claimants entrusted their refugee claims to lawyers for whom there are reasons to be 
concerned about the quality of services they provided.  
 In short, between 2008 and 2012, most Hungarian Romani refugee claimants found no refuge in 
Canada from the mistreatment they experienced in Hungary. 
 We want to be clear that we are not suggesting that all Hungarian Roma who made refugee 
claims during the period of our study actually met the refugee definition, as it is currently defined in 
Canada’s refugee determination system. We recognize that this definition involves constraining legal 
tests, and that not all Hungarian Romani refugee claims are able to meet these tests. 
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 That having been said, we think it is obvious that Roma have been mistreated in Hungary for 
centuries, and that they continue to be a severely marginalized minority. Even if, due to the narrowness of 
the refugee definition, some Hungarian Romani refugee claimants were not entitled to refugee protection 
in Canada during the period of our study, they were nonetheless entitled to access a fair refugee-
determination process. They should have received high-quality legal assistance, and, perhaps most 
importantly, they should not have been made the target of anti-refugee rhetoric on the part of government 
actors and others.  
 One of our interviewees offered this reflection on her experience accompanying the latest stream 
of Hungarian Roma as they made their refugee claims in Canada between 2008 and 2012:  
It’s just heart-breaking. [...] You see the wreckage of families, the terrible uncertainties 
that they face, the attendant health questions, the breakdowns, the stress, the waste of 
years of people’s lives. But I think the worst part for me is to see a whole group of people 
that have never experienced justice and they have this one little hope that Canada might 
be a place of justice and that is crushed. Then they say, well, that’s how we’ve always 
been treated, and how we always will. And that’s a terrible, terrible thing.251  
 
 We think Canada needs to learn from the experience of the latest stream of Hungarian Romani 
refugee claimants. The lesson to be learned, however, is not the one often cited by proponents of 
Canada’s new refugee-determination system. Instead, the lesson to be learned is that Canada still has 
some distance to go to fully embrace respect for the human rights of those seeking refuge from hatred, 
racism, and xenophobia.
252
 When the next stream of Hungarian Roma - or another marginalized group - 
come to Canada seeking refuge, the country must do better. 
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